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As one authority indicated at the time of the lower-court holding, the fear that excluding a section 59 designation will hinder the
valid application of Seider is unfounded. 60 If the basis for a Seider
attachment exists - if the insurer is doing business in New York - it
is likely that he will maintain an office in-state and service could be
effected there.1 1 In Saggese, the record failed to show that the insurer
did business in New York; he was merely authorized (under section
59) to do business. This alone was not sufficient presence "to justify
16 2
this particular levy in the circumstances of this particular action"'
and the attachment was properly vacated.
CPLR 6214(e): Time extension after expiration of ninety-day period
permitted subject to the rights of intervening lienors.
The problems inherent in the holding of Seider v. Roth'6 3 are
manifold. 164 One illustration is the difficulty involved in perfecting the
levy made pursuant to an order of attachment. For, under CPLR
6214(e), a levy is only effective for a period of ninety days after service
of process unless: the sheriff has taken actual custody of the property;
a special proceeding to take custody has been commenced; or, the court
extends the ninety-day period. Where, as in Seider, the attached property consists of the defendant's interest in an insurance policy, the
plaintiff is placed in the unenviable position of attempting to secure
165
custody of an intangible.
Postulating that an extension of the ninety-day period is the only
real remedy available in this situation, the court in Cenkner v. Shafer 66
recently denied a motion to vacate an attachment upon the condition
that plaintiff move for said extension within 67 twenty days.
Since ninety days had already elapsed, the Cenkner court qualified
its order by adding that the extension would not prejudice the rights
of an intervening creditor. 68 Thus, the lien of a second attaching
creditor would move into first position on the ninety-first day, and the
160 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary at 30-31 (1969).

161 See, e.g., Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633
(1967), reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 317, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
162 33 App. Div. 2d at 901, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 120.
163 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
164 See, e.g., Siegel, Simpson Upholds Seider-Problems for Both Sides, 159 N.Y.L.J.
16, Jan. 23, 1968, at 1,col. 3.
165 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 6214, supp. commentary at 34 (1967).

166 61 Misc. 2d 807, 306 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1970).
167 CPLR 6223.

168 See Seider v. Roth, 28 App. Div. 2d 698, 280 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't 1967). Presumably, the plaintiff must continue to move for a time extension for the duration of the
action. See 7B McKinNEY's CPLR 6214, supp. commentary at 34 (1967).
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subsequent time extension would not restore the initial order of
169
priority.
CPLR 6511(b): Absolute conformity with statutory content provisions
not required.
CPLR 6501 effectuates the policy that an action should not be
defeated (and justice thereby evaded) by the alienation of a defendant's
property during the pendency of an action. 7 0 Under this section, the
filing of a notice of pendency constitutes constructive notice that an
action affecting the title, possession, use, or enjoyment of real property
has been commenced. Thus, any subsequent purchaser from, or encumbrancer against, a defendant in the action is bound by the outcome as if he were himself a party.
In Mechanics Exchange Bank v. Chesterfield,"' the sufficiency of
a notice of pendency was challenged by the successful bidder at a foreclosure sale. The filed notice declared that the action was brought for
the "foreclosure of a mortgage" for the sum of $13,500, while actually
this sum was the total of two mortgages which had been combined; the
second mortgage reciting that "they shall constitute in law but one first
mortgage.., for $13,500.00."172 Both mortgages were recorded.
The defect was derived from the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, which requires that the notice contain the date of the
mortgage, the names of the parties, and the time and place of recording.173 The notice fulfilled these requirements only as to the second
mortgage.
The court, in determining the adequacy of the notice of pendency,
reasoned that the policy considerations underlying such notice' 74 only
require that the statutory provisions be followed to the extent "that
a purchaser or encumbrancer will be informed of the statutory items,
or given such information as to be put on inquiry as to them.... ,,17
Since a prospective purchaser or encumbrancer could have ascertained
that there were two mortgages involved by an examination of the
mortgage properly described in the notice of pendency, the court held
that the notice was sufficient and that the sale should be completed.
169 See 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 6214, supp. commentary (1968).
170 Hailey v. Ano, 186 N.Y. 569, 576, 32 N.E. 1068, 1070 (1893); Lamont v. Cheshire, 65
N.Y. 30, 26 (1875).
17134 App. Div. 2d 111, 309 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1970).
172 Id. at 113, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 549.
173 RPAPL § 1331.
174 See 7 WK&M
6511.06.
175 34 App. Div. 2d at 114, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 550 (emphasis added).

